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1. Introduction
The focus of healthcare has been shifted from healthcare providers’ paternalistic approach to patient-oriented approach. In this approach, patients
are well informed about their health information. They tend to understand,
follow instructions and ask more insightful questions. Allowing patients to
access their own records will encourage them to be involved in their own
healthcare. This will strengthen the patient-provider relationship and enhance the effectiveness of healthcare management.
Cloud Technology for PHR: Recently, Personal Health Record (PHR)
has been developed as a patient-centric model of the logistic of health information by using the cloud technology. PHR could be seen as the solution
for better management of an individual’s health, and as the tool that will
empower the patient in correlation with healthcare providers through the
ability to provide his/her own medical history. Furthermore, PHR allows a
patient to create, retrieve and manage his/her personal health data record
from one place to another place, through a cloud server. For example, Alice
may first see a doctor at Clinic A. Then the doctor refers her to Specialist
B. Alice may also need to take blood sample at laboratory C. Finally Alice
goes to Hospital D for acquiring medical treatment. By using PHR, Alice
does not need to bring along or transfer his/her paper-based medical record
among different healthcare providers, which contributes to the improvement
of patient’s comfort level by using cloud technology.
Data security is a key ingredient for cloud computing and especially important for cloud-based biomedical applications. Dealing with different national legal regulations and procedures accepted by the medical community
requires a careful approach [31]. Thus it is particularly important for PHR
to be securely instantiated. One of the major concerns is about whether the
patients can actually control the sharing of their sensitive personal health
information.
Legal Requirements: Legislation regarding confidentiality of health information is in place in countries around the world. In US, HIPAA (Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) regulates the privacy and confidentiality of health information, and there are sections regarding health
research in HIPAA. PIPEDA (Personal Information Protection and Electronic Document Act) in Canada and Data Protection Act 1998 (effective
since 2000) in UK are some of the examples that are in place for privacy
and confidentiality of health information. In Australia, New South Wales
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Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 which was effective since
September 2004 also stated “The organization that holds health information
must not use the information for a purpose other than the purpose for which
it was collected unless the use of health information for the secondary purpose is reasonably necessary for research, or the compilation or analysis of
statistics in the public interest”. The legislation makes the situation more
complicated.
A feasible solution is to encrypt the data prior to outsourcing to the
cloud. Symmetric encryption does not work as it requires the encryptor
and the decryptor to use the same key. It is likely both parties are not the
same (e.g. the laboratory encrypts a medical record while a clinic decrypts
it). In this case, key management remains the biggest issue. Asymmetric
encryption can be used instead. Compared to the traditional public key
infrastructure (PKI), Identity-based encryption (IBE) [38] shall be preferred
as the encryptor (e.g. laboratory) does not need to obtain the patient’s digital
certificate in advance which maybe inconvenient or impractical. Instead, it
may just use his name or national number as the identity to encrypt the data.
The patient can decrypt the data using his own secret key, which is given
by a Private Key Generator (PKG). In practice, it may be a government
authority.
It seems IBE can act as the security solution for PHR in the theoretical
framework. However, when we look into the practical scenario, it seems to be
difficult to facilitate, and hence impractical. IBE can only allow one specific
person to decrypt. Other than this particular person, no one else (except
the PKG) can decrypt. It is suitable if there is no sharing of PHR among
different persons, but this will lead to an impractical situation.
Sharing of Records: In some cases, doctors may want to discuss the
patient’s medical situation with other doctors or researchers. It is especially
important if the case is very special or has never been discovered before. It
can not only help the patient who may receive assistant from other specialists,
but also help future patients with the same symptom. Thus it would be
good if the medical system allows the sharing of PHR among specialists or
researchers in the same area. IBE cannot facilitate this kind of sharing as it
only allows the patient himself/herself to decrypt but not anyone else.
Sharing of PHR is trivial if privacy is not a concern. However, no one
wants his/her personal PHR to be disclosed completely even for research
purposes. It is also enforced by legal requirements in some countries.
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We adopt attribute-based encryption (ABE) as the cryptographic primitive to serve this purpose. By using ABE, access policies are expressed
as attributes of users or data, which enables a patient to selectively share
his/her PHR among a set of users (with eligible attributes) without knowing
their identities. In addition, we also deploy proxy re-encryption mechanism
so that the ciphertext for Doctor-A can be transformed to the ciphertext for
Doctor-B. This will enrich the secure sharing functionality of PHR.
Our Contributions. We propose a general framework for secure sharing of
PHRs. Our system can be deployed using the cloud technology, and hence,
it is a very practical and viable solution. Our system possesses the following
attractive features, while ensuring the patient’s privacy:
1) It allows a patient to securely store and share his/her PHR (e.g. to his/her
carers) in the cloud server.
2) A doctor can share his/her patient’s medical record to other specialists
for research purpose, if it is necessary. Yet the personal information of the
patient remains concealed.
3) Our system supports instantiation within the same domain (e.g. in the
same country) and different domains. It also supports multiple authorities
with different duties for key issuing tasks. It can prevent a single point of
failure.
2. Related Works
We review some related works in this section, which consists of two parts.
The first part describes some cryptographic primitives that can be used or
related to our goal. The second part describes PHR secure sharing protocols
in the literature and discusses why these protocols fail to fully fit our goal.
2.1. Cryptographic Primitives
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE). ABE allows the data owner to
share data with others in a more flexible way. At a high level, each potential
data recipient is associated with an attribute set S and given the associated
private key generated by a third party. The data provider can encrypt data
with a set of function. Anyone with an attribute set can successfully decrypt the ciphertext if and only if the set fulfills the function. ABE was first
introduced in [37]. Later on several variants and improvements have been
proposed [18, 21, 40, 34], including ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE, where
ciphertexts are associated with access policies and keys are associated with
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sets of attributes) and key-policy ABE (where keys are associated with access
policies and ciphertexts are associated with sets of attributes). Variants of
ABE are proposed later, such as [13, 41] for decentralizing the trusted private
key generator; [17] for outsourcing computation, [15] for efficient revocation,
ABE for circuits [12], online/offline ABE [14], leakage-resilient ABE [19, 44],
dual predicates and policies [3] and multi-authority ABE with large universe
[35].
ABE has been found useful in situations with the requirement of finegrained control on sensitive data such as PHR. An attribute-based infrastructure for PHR systems was proposed in [33], where each patient’s health
records are encrypted using a variant of CP-ABE that allows direct revocation. To achieve a flexible control on the encrypted data, a variant of ABE
that allows delegation of access rights is proposed in [27, 42]. Unfortunately,
none of these proposals allows the doctor to share patient’s medical record
with other specialists while preserving the patient’s privacy.
Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE). PRE, first introduced in [5] and formally
studied in [2], allows a semi-trusted proxy with a re-encryption key to convert
ciphertexts computed under Alice’s public key into those can be decrypted
using Bob’s private key [23, 25, 10]. The desirable feature is that the conversion is performed by the proxy without knowing the corresponding plaintexts.
Attribute-based Proxy Re-Encryption (ABPRE). Integrating ABE
and PRE is a promising solution for more flexible data sharing. The first
ciphertext-policy ABPRE scheme was proposed by Liang et al. [26], in which
a proxy is allowed to transform a ciphertext under a specialized access policy
into the one under another access policy (i.e. attribute-based re-encryption).
Mizuno and Doi [32, 11] proposed a hybrid PRE scheme (in general) where
ciphertexts generated in the context of ABE can be converted to the ones
which can be decrypted in the IBE setting. Other works on attribute-based
proxy re-encryption include [30, 43]. But all aforementioned schemes support access policy with AND gates only. The first construction of a CCA
secure CP-ABPRE supporting any monotonic access policy was given in [24].
However, it only supports one single private key generator (PKG) and is not
suitable for a large-scale PHR system which needs multiple authorities with
different duties (as required in our system).
2.2. Other Secure PHR Protocols
In the literature, there exists a few secure PHR protocols. Here we discuss
some of the state-of-the-art ones. In [22], Li et al. presented a patient-centric
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framework and a suite of mechanisms for data access control to PHRs stored
in semi-trusted servers using ABE. They allow the data owner (the patient)
to select the set of users who can access his own PHR. These may include
his family member, his doctor or hospital medical staffs. They also include
a “break-glass” emergency case such that the emergency department can
always access a patient’s PHR. It seems the protocol provides a completed
picture of PHR instantiation. However there are still some limitations. For
example, in case a doctor may need to discuss a particular PHR with other
researchers (such as a clinical finding), the protocol does not allow the doctor
to do so. Also it requires all users to be placed in the same domain (e.g.
same country). But in the real world, doctors or researchers from different
countries are likely to jointly discuss for some particular cases. Meanwhile
our proposed framework overcomes these limitations.
Technical Motivation. Other existing PHR systems using ABE can be
found in [16, 1]. However, they do not provide any sharing mechanism for
PHRs. On the other side, the protocol in [29] allows the sharing of personal health information (PHI) (instead of PHR) collected from body sensor
networks (BSNs) and securely shared by smartphone or opportunistic computing devices for emergency purpose. Thus their concept is totally different
from ours. The other ABPREs (discussed in Sec. 2.1) do not allow multiple
authorities to split the task of issuing user secret keys. Our proposed system
provides all desired features as described in last section while no single scheme
in the literature does. This contributes the main technical motiviation of this
paper.
3. Overview
3.1. Entities
There are a number of entities in our PHR system:
1) The Private Key Generator (PKG): It is further divided into two
types:
i) Central Authorities (CA): They are responsible for generating secret keys
for the PHR system, e.g. Health Department, state govenment, etc. We
employ the multi-authority setting for CA to avoid the key escrow problem of
a single authority. We assume that at least one authority is honest. The CAs
are responsible for issuing keys to users according to their unique identifiers.
ii) Attribute Authorities (AA): The authorities who are responsible for assigning attributes to user’s secret key. For example, an hospital can assign
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the attributes like “Hosptial A”, “City = NY” to all its staff. The medical association can assign the attributes related to medical professional license like
“Cardiologist”, “Psychiatrist” to different doctors or nurses. Universities,
laboratories and pharmacies are possible AAs.
2) Users: The patients, doctors, nurses, researchers and the emergency
departments are treated similarly when they obtain keys from the CAs and
the AAs. Therefore, they perform the same decryption process using their
own attribute-based keys.
3) Cloud Server: It is responsible for storage purpose only. It can be
accessed by all parties.
3.2. Functional Requirements
We require our system to achieve the following functions: 1) Data Confidentiality: Unauthorized users and cloud server cannot decrypt a PHR
document even they are colluding. Colluding CAs also cannot decrypt any
PHR document either, provided that at least one of them is honest. 2) User
Revocation: If a user’s attribute is no longer valid, the user cannot access
the PHR using that attribute. 3) Secure Sharing: If a user is able to decrypt a PHR document, the user can also securely share the decryption right
to another set of users (with a particular set of attribute). 4) Emergency
Access: The emergency department can decrypt any PHR in the emergency
situation.
3.3. Threat Model
We consider the threat from three entities. For the CA, as we deploy
multiple CAs setting, we require at least one CA to be honest and not curious.
Other remaining CAs can be honest but curious. That means they may try
to find out as much secret information from the transcripts but they will
honestly follow the protocol. For the cloud server, it may try to access the
files stored inside. For users, they may try to access the files beyond their
privileges. For example, a doctor from “Hospital B” may try to access the
files which can be accessed only to doctors from “Hospital A”.
3.4. Notation
Notations used in our system are shown in Table 1.
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Table 1: Frequently Used Notations
d
D
D
k
K
Uk
nk

U=

K
SK

k=1

Uk

a
A
id
Sid
GPK
CPKd , CAPKd
CMSKd
APKk , ACPKk
AMSKk
ucskid,d
ucpkid,d

uaska,id
DKid
RK

index of the CA
total number of CAs in the system
set of different CAs
index of the AA
total number of AAs in the system
set of attributes managed by AAk
the maximum number of attributes
each user can get from AAk
set of different AAs
attribute universe
an attribute
an access policy for a PHR document
identifier of a user
id’s set of attributes obtained from
different AAs
global public parameter
public keys of CAd
secret keys of CAd
public keys of AAk
secret keys of AAk
user-central-key for id, obtained from
CAd (part of his decryption key)
user-central-public-key for id, obtained
from CAd (used to obtain attributes
from AAs for his decryption key)
user-attribute-key for id with
attribute a
decryption key for id
re-encryption key

4. Secure Sharing (Same Domain)
We first consider the case of secure sharing of PHR within the same
domain. In practice, it maybe the case that all patients in the same country
use the same healthcare system.
4.1. Definition
Access Policy. We define how the access policy, like “(Hospital A AND
Cardiologist) OR Patient ID = Alice OR ER Dept”, can be expressed as any
monotonic access formula. We review their definitions.
Definition 1 (Access Structure [4, 40]). Let {P1 , . . . , Pn } be a set of
parties. A collection A ⊆ 2{P1 ,...,Pn } is monotone if ∀ B,C : if B ∈ A and
B ⊆ C then C ∈ A. A monotone access structure is a monotone collection A
of non-empty subsets of {P1 , . . . , Pn }. The sets in A are called the authorized
sets, and the sets not in A are called the unauthorized sets.
In our PHR scheme, the role of the user is taken by the attributes (e.g. Cardiologist, Hospital A). Thus, the access structure A contains the authorized
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sets of attributes. It is shown in [4] that any monotone access structure can
be realized by a linear secret sharing scheme.
Definition 2 (Linear Secret-Sharing Schemes (LSSS) [40]). A secret
sharing scheme Π over a set of parties P is called linear (over Zp ) if 1)
The shares for each party form a vector over Zp . 2) There exists a sharegenerating matrix A for Π which has l rows and n columns. For i = 1, . . . , l,
the ith row of A is labeled by a party ρ(i) (ρ is a function from {1, . . . , l} to
P). When we consider the column vector ~v = (s, r2 , . . . , rn ), where s ∈ Zp is
the secret to be shared and r2 , . . . , rn ∈ Zp are randomly chosen, then A~v is
the vector of l shares of the secret s according to Π. The share (A~v )i belongs
to party ρ(i).
Every LSSS defined above enjoys the linear reconstruction property [4]:
Suppose that Π is an LSSS for access structure A. Let S ∈ A be an authorized
set, and let I ⊂ {1, . . . , l} be defined as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. There exist
constants {ωi ∈ Zp }i∈I
P such that if {λi } are valid shares of any secret s
according to Π, then i∈I ωi λi = s. Furthermore, these constants {ωi } can
be found in time polynomial in the size of the share-generating matrix A. For
any unauthorized set, no such constants exist. In this paper, we use LSSS
matrix (A, ρ) to express an access policy associated to a ciphertext. Due to
space limitation, readers may refer to [40] for the algorithmic details.
Cryptographic Primitives. Our construction uses some cryptographic
primitives: (1) Pairings. Suppose G, GT are cyclic groups of prime order
p. Then ê : G1 × G2 → GT is pairing if ∀g ∈ G1 , h ∈ G2 and a, b ∈
Zp , ê(g a , hb ) = ê(g, h)ab and non-degeneracy. (2) Target Collision Resistant
(TCR) Hash Functions. Given a random element x which is from the valid
domain of a TCR hash function H, no polynomial time adversary A can
find y 6= x such that H(x) = H(y). (3) Secure Signature Scheme. Denote
Σsign = (KeyGen, Sign, Verify) as a secure signature scheme. KeyGen outputs
a signing key SignKey and a verification key VerifyKey. Sign takes a signing
key SignKey and a message m to produce a signature σ̃. Verify takes a
verification key VerifyKey, a message m and a signature σ̃ to output TRUE or
FALSE representing a valid signature and invalid signature respectively. We
deploy the BLS signature [6] due to its efficiency.
4.2. Main Idea
The main idea of our system is to deploy attribute-based encryption which
provides a good platform for a particular set of users (with the same at-
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tribute) to securely access some data stored in the cloud server. The sharing
functionality can be instantiated by using proxy re-encryption mechanism.
The proxy can re-encrypt a ciphertext for another party by an instruction
given by the original decrypting party. In this way, the original decrypting
party can share the access right with another group of users securely, while
the proxy itself knows nothing about the data.
4.3. Detailed Description of Our System
Our system is motivated from [28] and [43]. Detailed step-by-step construction is depicted in the subsequent framed boxes.
Setup. The system first defines some common public parameters. Each CA
and AA generates its own public key and secret key by itself. This part
contains the three algorithms.

• GlobalSetup(ψ) → GPK. The algorithm takes as input the security
parameter ψ and outputs the global public parameter GPK of the
system. It can be run by any trusted authority.
Let ê : G1 ×G2 → GT be a type 3 pairing with the base field size q, the embedding degree k and the group size p. The algorithm randomly chooses
g ∈ G1 , g, u ∈ G2 , ι ∈ Zp and sets h = g ι , h = gι . Denote Σsign as a secure
signature scheme. Define the TCR hash functions H1 : {0, 1}3ψ → Z∗p ,
H2 : GT → {0, 1}3ψ , H3 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 , H4 : {0, 1}ψ → Z∗p ,
H5 : {0, 1}∗ → G2 . Let ζ : U → K be a function that maps an attribute
to the index of the corresponding AA. The global public parameter is
published as GPK = (g, h, g, h, u, Σsign , H1 , H2 , H3 , H4 , H5 , ζ).

• CA-Setup(GPK, d) → (CPKd , CAPKd , CMSKd ). Each CAd generates
its own public keys (CPKd , CAPKd ) and secret keys CMSKd .
CAd runs KeyGen → (SignKeyd , VerifyKeyd ) and picks a random exponent
αd ∈ Zp . CAd publishes its public parameter CPKd = ê(g, g)αd , CAPKd =
VerifyKeyd . CAd sets its master secret key CMSKd = (αd , SignKeyd ).
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• AA-Setup(GPK, k, Uk , nk ) → (APKk , ACPKk , AMSKk ). Each AAk
generates its own public keys (APKk , ACPKk ) and secret keys
AMSKk based on attributes under its management Uk . Each user
has at most nk attributes managed by AAk .
For each attribute a ∈ Uk , AAk picks sa ∈ Zp and sets Ta = g sa , Ta = gsa .
For each d ∈ D, AAk randomly chooses vk,d ∈ Zp and sets Vk,d = g vk,d .
AAk publishes its public parameter APKk = {Ta , Ta |a ∈ Uk }, ACPKk =
{Vk,d |d ∈ D}. AAk sets its master secret key AMSKk = ({sa |a ∈
Uk }, {vk,d |d ∈ D}).
Key Generation. In order to obtain an attribute-based decryption key,
each user id contacts all CAs to obtain his partial secret key from each CA.
The role of CA is to certify that the user has the correct identity id. Suppose
the user is a cardiologist in hospital A. He should obtain a partial secret key
with respect to the attribute “Hospital A” from the AA “Hospital Authority”,
and should obtain another partial secret key with respect to the attribute
“Cardiologist” from the AA “Medical Association”. He does not need to
contact AAs that manage attributes unrelated to him. Finally, his decryption
key is the combination of all his partial secret keys obtained from CAs and
AAs.
This part contains two algorithms: the first one is for a user to obtain
key from CA, while the second one is for a user to obtain key for AA.
A Key Generation Scenario. We illustrate the process by which a user obtains his decryption key here. Let’s assume there are three CAs. In practice,
these CAs could be the health Department, the state government and the
immigration department. Assume user Sid who wishes to obtain his key
is a cardiologist in hospital A. Firstly, Sid sends his identity id to all the
CAs. Each CA validates the identity of Sid , and issues a user-central-key
and user-central-public-key for this user. Then, Sid contacts the Hospital
Authority to obtain his user-attribute-key for his attribute “Hospital A”.
Sid submits to the Hospital Authority the three user-central-public-keys he
obtained from the three CAs, together with the request that he would like
to obtain user-attribute-key for attribute “Hospital A”. The Hospital Authority validates the user-central-public-key and issues the user-attribute-key
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Figure 1: Obtaining keys from CAs and AAs.
for attribute “Hospital A”. Likewise, Sid contacts the Medical Association
following the same procedure to obtain his user-attribute-key for attribute
“Cardiologist”. Finally, Sid combines the obtained user-central-public-keys,
user-central-keys, user-attribute-keys to form his decryption key. The process
is shown in Figure 1.
• CA-KeyGen(id, GPK, {Vk,d |k ∈ K}, CMSKd ) → (ucskid,d , ucpkid,d ). A
user with identifier id visits CAd for obtaining a user-centralkey ucskid,d (used as part of his decryption key) and user-centralpublic-key ucpkid,d (used to obtain attributes from AAs for his
decryption key).
When a user submits his id to CAd to request the user-central-key, CAd
randomly picks rid,d ∈ Zp , then sets the user-central-key: ucskid,d =
gαd hrid,d , Lid,d = grid,d . For k ∈ [1, K], CAd computes Γid,d,k = gvk,d ·rid,d .
CAd computes σid,d ← Sign(SignKeyd , id||d||Lid,d ||{Γid,d,k }k∈[1,K] ). Let the
user-central-public-key ucpkid,d = (id, d, Lid,d , {Γid,d,k | k ∈ K}, σid,d ).
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• AA-KeyGen(a, {ucpkid,d |d
∈
D},
{VerifyKeyd |d
∈
D}, AMSKk , GPK) → uaska,id or ⊥. A user with identifier id
visits AAk for obtaining a user-attribute-key uaska,id for some
attribute a (used as part of his decryption key).
When a user submits his {ucpkid,d |d ∈ D} to AAk to request the
user-attribute-key for attribute a ∈ Uk , AAk parses ucpkid,d into
(id, d, Lid,d , {Γid,d,k |k ∈ K}, σid,d ).
1. For all d ∈ [1, D], it checks whether TRUE ← Verify(VerifyKeyd ,
id||d||Lid,d ||{Γid,d,k }k∈[1,K] , σid,d ) ∧ê(g, Γid,d,k ) = ê(Vk,d , Lid,d ). If there
is any failure, AAk outputs ⊥ to user which means that the submitted ucpkid,d are invalid.
2. For all d ∈ [1, D], AAk outputs the user-attribute-key uaska,id to
user where
uaska,id

D
Y
(Γid,d,k )sa /vk,d
=

(1)

d=1

=

D
Y

PD

grid,d sa = Ta

d=1 rid,d

(2)

d=1

Without knowing the value of rid,d , by running (1), AAk can compute the value as (2).
After obtaining keys from CAs and AAs, a user id, with attribute
set Sid , has a decryption-key defined as DKid = ({ucskid,d , Lid,d |d ∈
D}, {uaska,id |a ∈ Sid }).
PHR Encryption and Decryption. For each PHR file, it is encrypted
with a fine-grained access policy. Only authorized users are allowed to decrypt. The data owner is the patient, Alice. She obtains a secret key from the
CAs and her key is assigned with the attribute “Patient ID = Alice” from
her hospital (AA). For example, when she obtains her medical test result
from a laboratory, the result can be encrypted under the policy “(Hospital A
AND Cardiologist) OR Patient ID = Alice OR ER Dept”. Therefore, both
Alice, her doctor and the emergency department can access her record. The
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encryption and decryption algorithms are described as follow.

• PHR-Encrypt(M, A, GPK, {APKk }, {CPKd |d ∈ D}) → CT. It encrypts a medical record M based on the access policy A (e.g. “(Hosptial A AND Cardiologist) OR Patient ID = Alice”) and stores the
resulting ciphertext in the cloud server.
Suppose A is the access policy and M ∈ {0, 1}2ψ is the message to be
encrypted. M is further divided into M1 ∈ {0, 1}ψ which contains the
patient’s personal information; and M2 ∈ {0, 1}ψ which contains the
content of the medical record. Define A1 and A2 as the access policy
to encrypt M1 and M2 respectively. Ab is expressed by an LSSS matrix
(Ab , ρb ) for b ∈ {1, 2}, where: (1) Ab is an l × n matrix and ρb maps each
row Ax of Ab to an attribute ρb (x). It is required that ρb will not map two
different rows to the same attribute1 ; (2) Ab must contain the policy “OR
Patient ID = id” such that a patient can always access his own PHR; and
(3) Ab must contain the policy “OR ER Dept” such that the emergency
department can always access the health record in case of emergency.
Both M1 and M2 are encrypted using the following algorithm:
For b ∈ {1, 2}, the encryptor chooses a random γ ∈ {0, 1}ψ and runs
the following steps:
1. The algorithm chooses a random β ∈ {0, 1}ψ and computes s =
H1 (Mb , β, γ).
2. It sets a vector ~v = (s, v2 , . . . , vn ) ∈ Znp for some random
v2 , . . . , vn ∈ Zp .
3. Let Ax · ~v be the inner product of the xth row of Ab and the vector
~v .
4. For each x ∈ [1, l], it randomly picks rx ∈ Zp and comQ
αd ·s
putes: C = (Mb ||β||γ) ⊕ H2 ( D
), C 0 = g s ,
d=1 ê(g, g)
−r
x
{Cx = hAx ·~v · Tρb (x)
, Cx0 = g rx }x∈[1,l] , B = us , σ =
H3 (C, B, {Cx , Cx0 }x∈[1,l] , Ab )s .
The ciphertext is CTb = (C, C 0 , {Cx , Cx0 }x∈[1,l] , B, σ, Ab ). Recall that
Tρb (x) can be calculated from all APK.
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Finally the ciphertext (CT1 , CT2 ) are stored in the cloud server. Note
that the value γ is the same for both ciphertexts to ensure that CT1 and CT2
are encrypted at the same time.

• PHR-Decrypt(CT, GPK, {APKk }, DKid ) → M . The user id decrypts
a ciphertext CT in the cloud to retrieve the medical record M . If
CT consists of two parts CT1 and CT2 , then each of them undergoes
the following algorithms:
The ciphertext is parsed into (C, C 0 , {Cx , Cx0 }x∈[1,l] , B, σ, A =
(A, ρ)), and the decryption-key DKid is parsed into ({ucskid,d , Lid,d |d ∈
D}, {uaska,id |a ∈ Sid }). It outputs ⊥ if it fails any of the following checking:
ê(C 0 , u) = ê(g, B),
∧ ê(σ, u) = ê(H3 (C, B, {Cx , Cx0 }x∈[1,l] , A), B),
Y
ωx
∧ ê(C 0 , h) =
ê(Cx , g) · ê(Cx0 , Tρ(x) ) .

(3)

ρ(x)∈Sid

Otherwise, the algorithm computes
ucskid =
Lid =

D
Y
d=1
D
Y

ucskid,d = g

PD

d=1

PD

Lid,d = g

αd

d=1 rid,d

PD

h

d=1 rid,d

= grid ,

= gα hrid ,

(4)

d=1

where α =
PD

d=1 rid,d

PD

d=1

αd , rid =

PD

d=1 rid,d .

Note that ∀a ∈ Sid , uaska,id =

Traid .

Ta
=
If Sid satisfies the access
P policy (A, ρ), the algorithm computes constants
ωx ∈ ZN such that
ρ(x)∈Sid ωx Ax = (1, 0, . . . , 0). Then it computes
ê(C 0 ,ucskid )
ωx . It computes M ||β||γ = C ⊕ H2 (Z).
Z=Q
ρ(x)∈Sid

1

ê(Cx ,Lid )·ê(Cx0 ,uaskρ(x),id )

This restriction is crucial to the security proof. As in [28], we can use encoding
technique to remove this restriction.
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It outputs M if C 0 = g H1 (M,β,γ) . If CT consists of two parts, it outputs ⊥
if the decrypted value γ are different for both parts.
Secure Sharing. There are a few possible sharing methods for our PHR
system. A patient may want to share his entire PHR record to his family.
A doctor may want to share some medical test results to a researcher for
academic purpose, without disclosing any personal information of the patient.
Therefore, our PHR system first classifies a PHR record M into two parts:
personal information M1 may contain the patient’s name, home address, etc;
and medical record M2 which does not contain sensitive personal information.
They are encrypted by different access policy based on the actual need.
Our PHR system uses proxy re-encryption for secure sharing. The user
sends the proxy re-encryption key to the cloud server and asks the server
to re-encrypt the desired ciphertext to some new attributes. Using previous
example, the cardiologist in Hospital A can access Alice’s PHR record. If he
wants to share this record with some professors in University B, he can reencrypt the ciphertext of M2 to the attribute “University B AND Professor
AND Medicine Dept”. On the other hand, Alice can re-encrypt the ciphertext
of M1 and M2 to the attribute “ID = Bob” to her family member Bob. An
example of secure sharing is shown in Figure 2.
A Secure Sharing Scenario. We illustrate the process by which a user shares
part of his PHR record with another party. Assume a cardiologist in hospital
A, Sid , would like to share M2 of Alice’s PHR with all professors in the medical department of university B. Firstly, Sid uses algorithm ReKeyGen to generate a re-encryption key with Ã = {“U niversityB 00 ∧ “Deptof M edicine00 }.
The re-encryption key is sent to the sever. Then, the server invokes PHRReEnc, using the received re-encryption key, to perform re-encryption on M2
of Alice. After that, the proxy re-encryption of M2 will be sent to the intended recipient(s), i.e., the professor(s) in the medical department of university B. Finally, the professors execute PHR-ReDec using their own decryption
keys to obtain M2 of Alice. The process is shown in Figure 2.

• ReKeyGen(DKid , Ã, GPK) → RK. A doctor with identifier id wants
to re-encrypt some medical records to researchers satisfying some
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Figure 2: Secure Sharing

access policy Ã (e.g. “University X AND Dept of Medicine”). It
first generates a re-encryption key RK as follows.
The decryption-key DKid is parsed into ({ucskid,d , Lid,d |d ∈
D}, {uaska,id |a ∈ Sid }), Ã is the access policy which is expressed by an
LSSS matrix (Ã, ρ̃), where Ã is an ˜l × ñ matrix and ρ̃ maps each row Ãx
of Ã to an attribute ρ̃(x). The delegator does the followings:
1. The delegator chooses a random β̃, δ ∈ {0, 1}ψ and computes s̃ =
H1 (δ, β̃).
2. It sets a vector ~ṽ = (s̃, ṽ2 , . . . , ṽn ) ∈ Znp for some random
ṽ2 , . . . , ṽn ∈ Zp .
3. Let Ãx · ~ṽ be the inner product of the xth row of Ã and the vector
~ṽ.
4. For each x ∈ [1, ˜l], it randomly picks r̃x ∈ Zp and computes:
Q
~
−r̃x
αd ·s̃
C̃ = (δ||β̃) ⊕ H2 ( D
), C̃ 0 = g s̃ , {C̃x = hÃx ·ṽ · Tρ(x)
,
d=1 ê(g, g)
C̃x0 = g r̃x }x∈[1,l̃] , σ̃ = H5 (C̃, C̃ 0 , {C̃x , C̃x0 }x∈[1,l̃] , Ã)s̃ . Denote rk5 as
(C̃, C̃ 0 , {C̃x , C̃x0 }x∈[1,l̃] , σ̃, Ã).
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Q
H4 (δ) θ
θ
5. It randomly picks θ ∈ Zp and sets rk1 = D
d=1 ucskid,d ·g1 , rk2 = g ,
QD
H4 (δ)
H4 (δ)
rk3 = d=1 Lid,d
, rk4,a = usaka,id
∀a ∈ Sid .
6. It outputs the re-encryption key RK = (rk1 , rk2 , rk3 , rk5 , {rk4,a }, Sid )
Note that the patient can forward his PHR to his carers in a similar way.

• PHR-ReEnc(RK, CT) → CTR . If the doctor trusts the cloud server
on forwarding the correct ciphertext CT, he can send the reencryption key RK to the server; and the server outputs the reencrypted ciphertext CTR to the researcher (In this case, the cloud
server is semi-trusted: The honest-but-curious server is trusted to
perform the correct re-encryption, but it cannot access the content
of the PHR.) If the doctor does not trust the cloud server, he can
do the re-encryption by himself.
For a ciphertext CT = (CT1 , CT2 ), the algorithm should only reencrypt CT2 (the medical record without personal information) if it
is used for research purpose. If a patient wants to share his PHR
with his family, he can re-encrypt both CT1 and CT2 .
The re-encryption key RK is parsed into (rk1 , rk2 , rk3 , rk5 , {rk4,a }, Sid ) and
the ciphertext is parsed into (C, C 0 , {Cx , Cx0 }x∈[1,l] , B, σ, A = (A, ρ)). It
outputs ⊥ if it fails any of the following checking:
• Sid does not satisfies A;
• the ciphertext fails the validity check of equation 3;
• the re-encryption key rk5 = (C̃, C̃ 0 , {C̃x , C̃x0 }x∈[1,l̃] , σ̃, Ã) is invalid
when: ê(g, σ̃) 6= ê(C̃ 0 , H5 (C̃, C̃ 0 , {C̃x , C̃x0 }x∈[1,l̃] , Ã)).
P
Otherwise, it computes constants ωx ∈ Zp such that ρ(x)∈Sid ωx Ax =
(1, 0, . . . , 0). It calculates
B0 =

ê(rk2 , B) ·

Q

ê(C 0 , rk1 )
.
0
ωx
ρ(x)∈Sid (ê(Cx , rk3 ) · ê(Cx , rk4,x ))

(5)
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It outputs the re-encrypted
{Cx , Cx0 }x∈[1,l] , B, σ, rk5 , B 0 , Sid , A).

ciphertext

CTR

=

(C,

• PHR-ReDec(CTR , GPK, {APKk }, DKid0 ) → M . When the researcher
id0 receives a re-encrypted ciphertext CTR , he runs the re-decryption
algorithm to obtain the PHR record M using his own decryption key
DKid0 .
The
re-encrypted
ciphertext
CTR
is
parsed
into
(C,
0
0
0
{Cx , Cx }x∈[1,l] , B, σ, rk5 , B , Sid , A), and the decryption key DKid is
parsed into ({ucskid0 ,d , ucpkid0 ,d |d ∈ D}, {uaska,id0 |a ∈ Sid0 }).
It
1. It parses rk5 as (C̃, C̃ 0 , {C̃x , C̃x0 }x∈[1,l̃] , σ̃, Ã = (Ã, ρ̃)).
outputs ⊥ if Sid0 does not satisfies Ã; or ê(g, σ̃) 6=
ê(C̃ 0 , H3 (C̃, C̃ 0 , {C̃x , C̃x0 }x∈[1,l̃] , Ã)). Otherwise, it computes ucskid0
and Lid0 as
P in equation 4. It computes constants ωx ∈ ZN
such that ρ̃(x)∈Sid0 ωx Ãx = (1, 0, . . . , 0). Then it computes Z =
ê(C̃ 0 ,ucskid0 )

Q

ρ̃(x)∈Sid0

ωx . It computes δ||β̃ = H2 (Z) ⊕ C̃.

ê(C̃x ,Lid0 )·ê(C̃x0 ,uaskρ̃(x),id0 )

It outputs ⊥ if C̃ 0 6= g H1 (δ,β̃) .
0

1

It outputs ⊥
2. It calculates M ||β||γ = H2 (B H4 (δ) ) ⊕ C.
H1 (M,β)
if Sid does not satisfies A; or B 6= u
; or σ 6=
H3 (C, B, {Cx , Cx0 }x∈[1,l] , A)H1 (M,β,γ) . Otherwise, it outputs the message M .
3. If the re-encrypted ciphertext has two parts and the decrypted value
γ are different, output ⊥. Otherwise, output both messages.

Break-glass. To ensure break-glass access of PHR files in case of emergency,
our system requires that all PHR files must be encrypted with the policy
“OR ER Dept”. Therefore, the emergency department, having the valid
attribute-based key, can access the patient’s PHR files. To avoid the abuse
of the break-glass option, the emergency staff needs to verify his identity
and the emergency situation. Then the staff will obtain the re-encrypted
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ciphertext of the patient’s PHR records.
User Revocation. We consider the case of user revocation in our PHR
system. In addition to attributes, users also obtain keys related to the time
domain. Ciphertext are updated according to the time when there is user
revocation. A revoked user cannot obtain the updated key related to time.
Therefore, he cannot access the PHR files anymore. The advantage of our
proposed construction is that the cloud server does not need any secret information when performing ciphertext update, and it does not need to know
who is revoked.
Sahai et al. [36] proposed a generic construction to allow a third party
(cloud server) to disqualify revoked users from accessing data that was encrypted in the past. This process can be done without access to any sensitive
information by the cloud server. At the same time, newly encrypted data is
not decryptable by the revoked user’s key. Roughly speaking, they defined
piecewise CP-ABE in which each user has two keys with similar structure.
One key is associated with the user’s attribute, while the other key is associated with time. A ciphertext can be decrypted only by using two valid
keys together. A revoked user cannot update the key associated with time.
The cloud server only needs to re-encrypt the ciphertext according to time if
necessary. Note that the cloud server does not need any secret information
when performing ciphertext update, and it does not need to know who is
revoked. Our proposed scheme is compatible to the piecewise CP-ABE and
hence can be extended for key revocation.
4.4. Using Hybrid Encryption
As a PHR document is sometimes very large (e.g. includes X ray images), hybrid encryption can be used to improve the efficiency: Instead of
encrypting the PHR itself, PHR-Encrypt and PHR-ReEnc encrypt a randomly
generated key which is used to symmetric encrypt the PHR document. In
this way, the size of the “original message” (which is now actually the symmetric key) is much smaller and the encryption (and decryption) algorithm
will be more efficient.
4.5. Security Analysis
We analyze the security of our proposed system. First we show that it
achieves data confidentiality. Our scheme is selectively secure against chosen ciphertext attack (CCA), for both original ciphertext and re-encrypted
ciphertext. In short, our security model protects the confidentiality of PHR
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encrypted for the access policy A even if: (1) only one CA is honest, other
CAs are corrupted, (2) all AAs are corrupted, and (3) all users not satisfying
A are corrupted. The strong chosen ciphertext security guarantees confidentiality even if the adversary obtains decryption of other ciphertexts for the
access policy A.
User revocation can be easily seen in our scheme description. Secure
sharing is realized as our encryption scheme achieves CCA security against
re-encrypted ciphertext. That is, no unauthorized party including the cloud
server can decrypt the ciphertext. Emergency access can be facilitated as
“OR ER Dept” is always included in the policy so that ER Dept can always
decrypt any PHR document for emergency situation. If the patient accidentally forgets to include the emergency department, it is noticeable from the
ciphertext since the access policy is included as part of the ciphertext.
We can prove our scheme in the even stronger adpative security model if
we extend our scheme to the composite order bilinear groups, and employ
the dual system encryption [39] in the security proof, which is similar to the
proof in [28]. We give the selective-attribute secure scheme in this paper
because of its simplicity and the ease of understanding.
Selective-Attribute CCA Security Model for Original Ciphertext.
The security model is defined by the following game run between a challenger
B and an adversary A. A can corrupt CAs and AAs by specifying Kc ⊂ K
and Dc ⊂ D after seeing the public parameters2 , where D \ Dc 6= ∅ and
K \ Kc 6= ∅.
Setup: The challenger B runs GlobalSetup(ψ), CASetup(GPK, d) (∀d ∈ [1, D])
and AASetup(GPK, k, Uk ) (∀k ∈ [1, K]). The values GPK, {CPKd , CAPKd |d ∈
D} and {APKk , ACPKk |k ∈ K} are given to the adversary A. A specifies index sets Dc ⊂ D and Kc ⊂ K as the corrupted CAs and AAs respectively,
where D \ Dc 6= ∅ and K \ Kc 6= ∅. A specifies an access policy A∗ . Then B
gives A∗ , {CMSKd |d ∈ Dc } and {AMSKk |k ∈ Kc } to A.
Query Phase 1: The adversary can query the following oracles: (i) CKQ(id, d)
where d ∈ D \ Dc : (User-central-key Query) A queries with a pair (id, d),
where id is an identifier and d ∈ D \ Dc is the index of an uncorrupted
2
This is stronger than static corruption model used in [8, 9], where the adversary has
to specify the authorities to corrupt before seeing the public parameters. But on the other
aspect, it is weaker than the model in [20], where corrupted authorities are set by the
adversary.
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CA, and obtains the corresponding user-central-key (ucskid,d , ucpkid,d ). (ii)
AKQ(a, k, {ucpkid,d |d ∈ D}) where k ∈ K \ Kc : (User-attribute-key Query) A
queries with (a, k, {ucpkid,d |d ∈ D}), where k ∈ K \ Kc is the index of an
uncorrupted AA, {ucpkid,d |d ∈ D} are id’s user-central-public-keys, and a
is an attribute in Uk . The oracle returns a user-attribute-key uaska,id or ⊥
if {ucpkid,d } are invalid. (iii) RKQ(Sid , Ã): (Re-encryption-key Query) A
queries with the user attributes Sid , and an access structure Ã, and obtains
the re-encryption key RK ← ReKeyGen(DKid , Ã, GPK), where DKid is the decryption key for Sid computed from the CAs and AAs. (iv) REQ(Sid , Ã, CTA ):
(Re-encryption Query) A queries with the user attributes Sid , an access
structure Ã and a ciphertext CTA for the access structure A. Denote the
re-encryption key RK ← ReKeyGen(DKid , Ã, GPK), where DKid is the decryption key for Sid computed from the CAs and AAs. A obtains the reencrypted ciphertext CTR ← ReKeyGen(DKid , Ã, GPK) or the ⊥ symbol for
failure. (v) DQ(CT, Sid ): (Decryption Query) A queries with a ciphertext CT, the decryptor’s set of attributes Sid , and obtains the plaintext
M ← PHR − Decrypt(CT, GPK, {APKk }, DKid ) or the ⊥ symbol for failure,
where DKid is the decryption key for Sid computed from the CAs and AAs.
(vi) RDQ(CTR , Sid0 ): (Re-Decryption Query) A queries with a ciphertext
CTR , the decryptor’s set of attributes Sid0 , and obtains the corresponding
plaintext M ← PHR − ReDecrypt(CTR , GPK, {APKk }, DKid0 ) or the ⊥ symbol for failure, where DKid0 is the decryption key for Sid0 computed from the
CAs and AAs.
Challenge Phase: A submits two equal-length messages M0∗ , M1∗ . B flips
a random coin β ∈ {0, 1} and sends a ciphertext CT∗ to A an encryption of
Mβ∗ under A∗ .
Query Phase 2: A further queries as in Query Phase 1.
Guess: A submits a guess β 0 for β.
For a fixed id, the related attribute set is defined as Aid = {a | AKQ(a, k,
{ucpkid,d |d ∈ D}) is made by A}. A wins the game if β 0 = β under the
restriction that
S
1. there is no Aid such that Aid ∪ ( kc ∈Kc Ukc ) can satisfy the challenge
access policy A∗ ;
2. there is no DQ on CT∗ with input attributes Sid satisfying A∗ ;
S
3. there is no Aid0 such that Aid0 ∪ ( kc ∈Kc Ukc ) can satisfy some access
policy
Ã where RKQ(Sid , Ã) or REQ(Sid , Ã, CT∗ ) was queried and Sid ∪
S
( kc ∈Kc Ukc ) can satisfy the challenge access policy A∗ ;
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4. there is no RDQ for any CTA0 with input attributes Sid0 satisfying
A0 , where CTA0 is a derivative of CT∗ . Derived from the definition
of derivative for proxy re-encryption [7], the derivative of CT∗ is defined as follows: (i) CT∗ is a derivative of itself. (ii) If A has issued RKQ(Sid , A0 ) and obtains the re-encryption key RK, Sid ∈ A∗ ,
and CTA0 ← PHR − ReEnc(RK, CT∗ ), then CTA0 is a derivative of CT∗ .
(iii) If A has issued REQ(Sid , A0 , CT∗ ) with Sid ∈ A∗ and obtains the
re-encrypted ciphertext CTA0 , then CTA0 is a derivative of CT∗ .
The advantage of A is defined as |Pr[β = β 0 ] − 1/2|.
Definition 3. A system is selective-attribute secure against IND-CCA-Or if
for all polynomial-time adversary A in the game above, the advantage of A
is negligible.
Remarks: (1) We assume that a user with identifier id requests for the
central key from each CAd only once, i.e., for each id there is only one set
of user-central-keys, {ucpkid,d |d ∈ D}. This is not a restriction, but can help
simplify the system description. Using a timestamp as another index for
ucpk can remove this assumption. (2) In the security model above, A has
the master secret keys {CMSKd |d ∈ Dc }, so the user only needs to query
CKQ(id, d) for d ∈ D \ Dc to get (ucskid,d , ucpkid,d ), and the user can generate
{(ucskid,d , ucpkid,d )|d ∈ Dc } if they are needed for querying AKQ. (3) The
model above can be converted to adaptive-attribute security by allowing A
to output the challenge access policy A∗ in the challenge phase instead.
Selective-Attribute CCA Security Model for Re-encrypted Ciphertext. The security definition for the re-encrypted ciphertext can be defined
similarly.
1. Setup. Same as the previous game.
2. Query Phase 1. Same as the previous game.
3. Challenge. A submits two equal-length messages M0∗ , M1∗ and a set
of attributes S satisfying an access policy A. B flips a random coin
β ∈ {0, 1} and calculates a ciphertext CT∗ which is the encryption
of Mβ∗ under A. B calculates the re-encryption key RK from S to
the challenge access policy A∗ and returns the re-encrypted challenge
ciphertext CT∗R computed from PHR-ReEnc using RK and CT∗ . B
4. Query Phase 2. Same as the previous game.
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5. Guess. Same as the previous game.
A wins the game if β 0 = β under the same restriction (for AKQ and RKQ)
except that: (1) there is no restriction on DQ query; (2) there is no RDQ
query on CT∗R .
Security Proofs. We first introduce the assumption used in the theorem.
It is modified from the decisional q-parallel BDHE assumption [40], for using
it in the asymmetric pairing setting.
Definition 4. Asymmetric Decisional q-parallel BDHE Assumption.
q
Given a bilinear group BG = (p, ê, G1 , G2 , GT ), define a tuple y = g, g a , . . . , g a ,
q+2
2q
q
q
g a , . . . , g a , g, gs , ga , . . . , ga , ∀1≤j≤q g s·bj , g a/bj , . . . , g a /bj , ∀1≤j≤q gs·bj , ga/bj ,
q
q+2
2q
q
. . . , ga /bj , ga /bj , . . . , ga /bj , ∀1≤j,k≤q,k6=j g a·s·bk /bj , . . . , g a ·s·bk /bj , where a, s,
b1 , . . . , bq ∈R Zp , g is a generator of G1 and g is a generator of G2 . Deq+1
note T0 = ê(g, g)a ·s and T1 ∈R GT . The Asymmetric Decisional q-parallel
BDHE problem is to give (BG, y, Tb ) to an adversary A, and A decides if
b = 0/1. Define the advantage of A as | Pr[A(BG, y, Tb ) = b] − 12 |. The
Asymmetric Decisional q-parallel BDHE Assumption holds in (G1 , G2 , GT )
if no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm has non-negligible advantage.
As discussed in [43], the re-randomizability guarantee (needed for delegation) and the CCA2 security seems to be contradictory. We also use the
similar approach as in [43] to deal with this problem: we prevent adversaries
from modifying the message or the access structure by signing just on partial ciphertext components (not signing on C 0 ); re-encryption is just limited
to updating partial ciphertext components. Based on this observation, we
adopt the same technique as [43] by just sign on partial ciphertext components. We now give the security proofs for the original ciphertext and the
re-encrypted ciphertext.
Theorem 1. Our scheme is selective-attribute secure against IND-CCA-Or
if the asymmetric decisional q-parallel BDHE assumption holds in the random
oracle model.
Proof: Suppose there exists an adversary A who can break the IND-CCAOr security of our scheme. Given the decisional q-parallel BDHE problem
instance (p, G1 , G2 , GT , y, T ), we construct an algorithm C to decide whether
q+1
T = ê(g, g)a s or not.

25

Setup. C chooses a random ζ ∈ Z∗p and sets h = g a , h = ga , u = gζ C sets the
rest of GPK as in GlobalSetup and sends GPK to A.
A returns the challenge access structure (M ∗ , ρ∗ ) to C, where M ∗ is an
l∗ × n∗ matrix, l∗ , n∗ ≤ q.
0
q
C chooses some random αd0 ∈ Z∗p and sets CPKd = ê(g a , ga ) · ê(g, g)αd . It
implicitly sets αd = aq+1 + αd0 . It runs (SignKeyd , VerifyKeyd ) ← KeyGen and
sets CAPKd = VerifyKeyd .
C randomly chooses zx ∈ Zp and computes APKk as (for all x ∈ Uk ): Tx =
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
an M ∗ ∗
an M ∗ ∗
aMi,1
a2 Mi,2
a2 Mi,2
aMi,1
i,n
i,n
Q
Q
+
+···+
+
+···+
zx
z
bi
bi
bi
bi
g · i∈X g bi
, Tx = g x · i∈X g bi
,
where X denote the set of indices i such that ρ∗ (i) = x, for i ∈ [1, l∗ ]. C
randomly chooses vk,d ∈ Zp and computes ACPKk as Vk,d = g vk,d . C sends
{CPKd , CAPKd }d∈D , {APKk , ACPKk }k∈K ) to A.
C also maintains some lists which are initially empty: (1) H1List , . . . , H5List ,
U ASK List stores the tuple (input; output; tag) for the oracle queries for
H1 , . . . , H6 , AKQ respectively. (2) RK List stores the tuple (input; output;
tag) for the oracle queries for RKQ, where tag consists of δ, β̃ and three bits
b1 , b2 , b3 , denote that the re-encryption key is randomly chosen, generated by
REQ or RKQ respectively. (3) RE List stores the tuple (input; output; tag) for
the oracle queries for REQ, where tag consists of three bits b1 ||b2 ||b3 , denote
that the re-encrypted ciphertext is generated under a valid re-encryption
key, under a randomly chosen re-encryption key, or generated without any
re-encryption key respectively.
Query Phase 1. C answers the queries to the oracles as follows: (1) H1 , H2 , H4 :
For every query, if there is an entry (input; output; ⊥) in the corresponding H list, C returns the corresponding output. Otherwise, C returns a
random output in the range and stores (input; output; ⊥) in the corresponding H list. (2) H3 : For every query, if there is an entry (input; output; ·) in H3List , C returns the corresponding output. Otherwise, C picks
a random ξ1 ∈ Zp , returns g ξ1 and stores (input; g ξ1 ; ξ1 ) in H3List . (3)
H5 : For every query, if there is an entry (input; output; ·) in H5List , C returns the corresponding output. Otherwise, C picks a random ξ2 ∈ Zp ,
returns gξ2 and stores (input; gξ2 ; ξ2 ) in H5List . (4) CKQ: On input id and
∗
0
d ∈ D \ Dc , C randomly chooses rid,d
∈ Zp , (w1,d , w2,d , . . . , wn∗ ,d ) ∈ Znp
P ∗
∗
such that w1,d = −1 and nj=1 wj,d · Mi,j
= 0 for all i3 . C computes: Lid,d =
3

Such a vector (w1,d , w2,d , . . . , wn∗ ,d ) must exist by the convention of LSSS.
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0

q +...+w ∗ aq−n∗ +1
n ,d

grid,d +w1,d a

v

0

0

k,d
, ucskid,d = gαd ·garid,d ·
, Γid,d,k = Lid,d

Qn∗

q−n∗ +1

q

i=2

q+2−i ·w
i,d

ga

. C generates the signature σid,d and re= gαd (ga )rid,d +w1,d a +...+wn∗ ,d a
turns ucskid,d , ucpkid,d = (id, d, Lid,d , {Γid,d,k |k ∈ K}, σid,d ). (5) AKQ: On input
a, k ∈ K \ Kc and ucpkid,d for d ∈ D, C first verifies the signature in ucpkid,d
as in AA-KeyGen. If it passes the verification, C computes:
∗

uaska,id = Tzaa ·

D YY
n
Y

g

0
·rid,d

n
Y

·

d=1 i∈X j=1

=

Tzaa

·

D
Y

g

0
(rid,d
+

∗
!Mi,j

∗

aj
bi

g

aq+1+j−y
bi

·wy,d

y=1,y6=j

Pn∗

y=1

wy,d aq−y+1 )·

P

i∈X

P n∗

j=1

∗
aj Mi,j
bi

d=1

=

D
Y

∗

g

0
(rid,d
+

n
P

y=1

P

∗
aMi,1

i∈X

bi

wy,d aq−y+1 )(za +

+···+

∗
an M ∗ ∗
i,n
bi

)

d=1
PD

= g d=1 rid,d sa
P ∗
∗
= 0, the terms for y = j is canceled out in
Recall that since nj=1 wj,d · Mi,j
the above equation. (6) RKQ: On input Sid , Ã, if ((Sid , Ã); RK; (δ, β̃, ·, 0, 1)) ∈
RK List , C returns RK to A. Otherwise:
• If Sid ∈ A∗ and (S 0 , uask) ∈ U ASK List (for any S 0 ∈ Ã), C aborts the
simulation (due to the restriction of the security model).
• If Sid ∈ A∗ and (S 0 , uask) ∈
/ U ASK List (for all S 0 ∈ Ã), C checks
if ((Sid , Ã); RK; (δ, β̃, 1, 1, 0)) ∈ RK List . If true, C returns RK to A
and resets b2 = 0, b3 = 1. Else, C chooses some random θ, σ, r0 ∈
Zp , δ, β̃ ∈ {0, 1}ψ and K ∈ G2 for all a ∈ Sid . C sets rk1 = Kσ ·
0
0
gθ1 , rk2 = g θ , rk3 = gr σ , rk4,a = Tra σ , and constructs rk5 as in the real
scheme. Finally C returns RK = (rk1 , rk2 , rk3 , {rk4 }, rk5 , Sid ) and adds
((Sid , Ã); RK; (δ, β̃, 1, 0, 1)) to RK List .
• Otherwise, Sid ∈
/ A∗ . If ((Sid , Ã); RK; (δ, β̃, 0, 1, 0)) ∈ RK List , C returns
RK and resets b2 = 0, b3 = 1. Else C first constructs RK as in the
real scheme, returns RK to A and adds ((Sid , Ã); RK; (δ, β̃, 0, 0, 1)) to
RK List .
(7) REQ: On input (Sid , Ã, CTA ), C aborts if CTA fails the validity checking
(i.e. Sid does not satisfy A or it fails the checking of equation 3.). Otherwise:
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• If Sid ∈ A∗ and (S 0 , uask) ∈ U ASK List (for any S 0 ∈ Ã), C checks if
there exists (·; s) ∈ H1List such that C 0 = g s . If no such tuple exists, C
returns ⊥. Else C checks if ((Sid , Ã); ⊥; (δ, β̃, ⊥, 1, ⊥)) ∈ RK List . If no,
C chooses δ, β̃ ∈ {0, 1}ψ , generates
rk as in the real scheme and conPD 50
0
a aq D
αd sξ2
d=1
structs B = (ê(g , g ) · ê(g, g)
) , where ξ2 = H4 (δ). Finally,
C returns the re-encrypted ciphertext CTR to A (with B 0 ) and adds
((Sid , Ã); ⊥; (δ, β̃, ⊥, 1, ⊥)) to RK List and adds ((Sid , Ã); CTR ; (0, 0, 1))
to RE List .
• If Sid ∈ A∗ and (S 0 , uask) ∈
/ U ASK List (for all S 0 ∈ Ã), C first constructs
the re-encryption key RK as the second case of RKQ and further reencrypts CTA to a ciphertext CTR for A. C adds ((Sid , Ã); RK; (δ, β̃, 1, 1, 0))
to RK List and adds ((Sid , Ã); CTR ; (0, 1, 0)) to RE List .
• If Sid ∈
/ A∗ , C first constructs the re-encryption key RK as the third case
of RKQ and further re-encrypts CTA to a ciphertext CTR for A. C adds
((Sid , Ã); RK; (δ, β̃, 0, 1, 0)) to RK List and adds ((Sid , Ã); CTR ; (1, 0, 0))
to RE List .
(8) DQ: On input (CTA , Sid ), C aborts if CTA fails the validity checking (i.e.
Sid does not satisfy A or it fails the checking of equation 3.). Otherwise:
• If (S 0 , uask) ∈ U ASK List (for any S 0 ∈ Ã), C recovers the message as
in the real scheme using uask.
• Else, C checks if ((M, β, γ); s) ∈ H1List such that C 0 = g s and (R, δ1 ) ∈
H2List such that R = (M ||β||γ)⊕δ1 . C outputs ⊥ if no such tuple exists;
or outputs M otherwise.
(9) RDQ: On input (CTR , Sid0 ) with respect to A0 = (M 0 , ρ0 ), C outputs ⊥ if
one of the following is true:
• there are no tuples ((M, β, γ); s), ((δ, β̃); s̃) in H1List such that B = us
and C̃ 0 = g s̃ ;
• the ciphertext fails the validity check of equation 3.
Otherwise, C proceeds as follow:
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• If ((Sid , A0 ); RK; (δ, β̃, 1, 0, 1)) ∈ RK List or ((Sid , A0 ); CTR ; (0, 1, 0)) ∈
RE List , C checks if
Y
Y
x
ê(
(6)
C̃xwx , g) = ê(C̃ 0 , h) ·
ê(C̃x0 , T−w
ρ0 (x) ),
ρ0 (x)∈Sid0

ρ0 (x)∈Sid0

where withPthe knowledge of (M 0 , ρ0 ), C can find some constants wx
such that ρ0 (x)∈Sid0 wx Mx0 = (1, 0, . . . , 0). If equation 6 does not hold,
C outputs ⊥. Otherwise, C reconstructs C 0 = g s with the knowledge
of s and checks if equation 3 holds. If not, C outputs ⊥. Otherwise,
C uses the above random re-encryption key RK to check the validity of
B 0 as in equation 5. If it does not hold, C outputs ⊥. Otherwise, C
q
checksPif (R; δ1 ) ∈ H2List for δ1 = C ⊕ (M ||β||γ) and R = (ê(g a , ga )D ·
ê(g, g) d=1,D αd )s . If no such tuple exists, C outputs ⊥. Else C returns
M to A. (Note that C checks the derivatives of the challenge ciphertext
in the above manner.)
• Else if (Sid0 , uask) ∈ U ASK List , C recovers M as in the real scheme
using uask.
• Else C outputs ⊥ if any of the following is true: (1) Equation 3 or 6 does
not hold; (2) If no tuple P
(R; δ1 ) ∈ H2List exists for δ1 = C⊕(M ||β||γ) and
a aq D
R = (ê(g , g ) ·ê(g, g) d=1,D αd )s ; or (3) σ = H3 (C, B, {Cx , Cx0 }x∈[1,l] , A)s
or B 0 = RH4 (δ) does not hold.
Otherwise, C outputs M .
Challenge. A outputs M0∗ , M1∗ to C. C chooses a random bit b and responds
as follows.
For each row i of M ∗ , set x∗ = ρ∗ (i). For all i ∈ [1, l∗ ], denote Ri
as the set of all i 6= y such that ρ∗ (i) = ρ∗ (y). C chooses some random χ2 , . . . , χn∗ , r10 , . . . , rl0∗ ∈ Zp and implicitly sets the vector ~v = (s, sa +
∗
∗
0
−r0 Q ∗
χ2 , . . . , san −1 + χn∗ ) by setting: Ci0 = g ri +sbi , Ci = Tx∗ i · nj=2 g a·χj Mi,j ·
aj sbi
Q
Q ∗
∗
g −bi s·zx∗ · y∈Ri nj=1 (g by )−My,j . C chooses some random β ∗ , γ ∗ ∈ {0, 1}ψ
PD

0

and C ∗ ∈ {0, 1}3ψ , sets C 0 = g s , B∗ = us = gsζ and puts (T D ·ê(g, g) i=1 αd ; C ∗ ⊕
∗
(Mb∗ ||β ∗ , γ ∗ )) in H2List . C chooses a random ξ1∗ ∈ Zp , sets σ ∗ = (g s )ξ1 and
∗
puts ((C ∗ , B∗ , {Cx , Cx0 }x∈[1,l∗ ] , A∗ ); g ξ1 ; ξ1∗ ) in H3List .
C returns the challenge ciphertext CT∗ = (C ∗ , C 0 , {Cx , Cx0 }x∈[1,l] , B∗ , σ ∗ , A∗ ).
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Query Phase 2. Same as the Query Phase 1.
Guess. A outputs a guess b0 . If b = b0 , then C answers its challenger that
q+1
T = ê(g, g)a s ; else C decides that T ∈R GT .
Analysis. We consider the cases for simulation failure:
PD

0

• A queries (Mb∗ , β ∗ , γ ∗ ) to H1 or T D · ê(g, g) i=1 αd to H2 in phase 1.
Denote these events as H∗1 and H∗2 respectively, and the probability of
T CR
T CR
these events as AdvH
and AdvH
respectively.
∗
∗
1 ,A
2 ,A
• A submits a valid original ciphertext to REQ without issuing the query
H1 . Denote this event as ReEncErr and it appears with probability
≤ qREQ
, where qREQ is the number of REQ queries.
p
• A submits
ciphertext to DQ or RDQ without querying
Q a validαoriginal
d H1 (M,β,γ) to H .
ê(g,
g)
Let valid be the event that the
Z = D
2
d=1
ciphertext is valid, QueryH1 be the event that A has queried (M, β, γ)
to H1 and QueryH2 be the event that A has queried Z to H2 . From
the simulation, we have Pr[valid|¬QueryH2 ] ≤ Pr[QueryH1 |¬QueryH2 ] +
q
q
Pr[valid|¬QueryH1 ∧¬QueryH2 ] ≤ 2H3ψ1 + p1 , Pr[valid|¬QueryH1 ] ≤ Hp 2 + p1 ,
where qH1 and qH2 are the number of H1 and H2 queries respectively.
Denote DecErr as the event that valid|(¬QueryH1 ∨ ¬QueryH2 ). Then
2+q
q
we have Pr[DecErr] = ( 2H3ψ1 + pH2 ) · (qDQ + qRDQ ), where qDQ and qRDQ
are the number of DQ and RDQ queries respectively.
Let Bad be the event that (H∗1 |¬H∗2 )∨H∗2 ∨ReEncErr∨DecErr. Then we have A’s
advantage:  = | Pr[b = b0 ]− 12 | ≤ 12 Pr[Bad] = 12 Pr[(H∗1 |¬H∗2 )∨H∗2 ∨ReEncErr∨
q

+q

(q

+q

)

(2+q

)(q

+q

)+qREQ

H2
DQ
RDQ
T CR
DecErr] ≤ 21 (AdvH
+ H1 H123ψDQ RDQ +
∗
p
2 ,A
the advantage of solving the problem instance is at least

1

qH1 +qH1 (qDQ +qRDQ )
23ψ

1
qH2

). Therefore,
T CR
(AdvH
) ≥
∗
2 ,A

(2+qH2 )(qDQ +qRDQ )+qREQ
),
p

(2 −
−
which is not negligible if 
is not negligible. Finally, it is straightforward to see that the above simulation
runs in polynomial time.
qH2

Theorem 2. Our scheme is selective-attribute secure against IND-CCA-Re
if the asymmetric decisional q-parallel BDHE assumption holds in the random
oracle model.
Proof: The security proof is almost the same as the IND-CCA-Or security
proof. We only sketch the differences below: The Setup and the Guess phase
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are the same as before. The Query Phase 1 and 2 are almost the same, except
following the query constraints in the IND-CCA-Re security model.
Challenge. A outputs M0∗ , M1∗ and an access policy A = (A, ρ) to C (A is an
l × n matrix). C chooses a random bit b and responds as follows.
C encrypts Mb∗ for A as in the real PHR-Encrypt scheme and obtains
CTA = (C, C 0 {Cx , Cx0 }x∈[1,l] , B, σ, A).
During the PHR-Encrypt computation, ((Mb∗ , β, γ); s) is stored in H1List .
ψ
C picks some random β̃, δ ∗ ∈ {0, 1}P
and issues the H4 (δ ∗ ) query to obtain
D
0
∗
q
ξ2∗ . C sets B 0 = (ê(g a , ga )D · ê(g, g) d=1 αd )sξ2 .
Recall that the challenge access policy is (M ∗ , ρ∗ ) where M ∗ is an l∗ × n∗
matrix). Denote x∗ = ρ∗ (i). C chooses some random χ2 , . . . , χn∗ , r10 , . . . , rl0∗ ∈
aj sbi
Qn ∗
Q
∗
∗
−ri0 Qn∗
a·χj Mi,j
−bi szx∗
ri0 +sbi
0
·g
· y∈Ri j=1 (g bk )−My,j ,
, C̃i = Tx∗ · j=2 g
Zp by setting: C̃i = g
where for all i ∈ [1, l∗ ], denote Ri as the set of all i 6= y such that ρ∗ (i) =
ρ∗ (y).
C chooses some random β ∗ , γ ∗ ∈ P
{0, 1}ψ and C̃ ∈ {0, 1}3ψ , sets C̃ 0 = g s ,
D
0
B∗ = us = gsζ and puts (T D · ê(g, g) i=1 αd ; C̃ ⊕ (Mb∗ ||β ∗ , γ ∗ )) in H2List .
∗
C picks a random ξ3∗ ∈ Zp and sets σ̃ = (g s )ξ3 . C puts ((C̃, C̃ 0 , {C̃i , C̃i0 }i∈[1,l∗ ] , A∗ ); σ̃; ξ3∗ )
in H5List .
C sets rk∗5 = (C̃, C̃ 0 , {C̃i , C̃i0 }i∈[1,l∗ ] , σ̃, A∗ ). C returns the challenge reencrypted ciphertext CT∗R = (C, {Cx , Cx0 }x∈[1,l] , B, σ, rk∗5 , B∗ , Sid , A).
Analysis. It is obvious that CTA is the challenge phase is valid. If T =
q+1
ê(g, g)a s , then rk∗5 is (part of) a valid re-encryption key. The challenge reencrypted ciphertext is re-encrypted with this key. If T ∈ GT , the challenge
ciphertext is independent of the bit b chosen by C in the view of A.
The probability analysis is almost the same as the previous proof, except
that we have to take the event H5∗ into account: the event that A has queried
(C̃, C̃ 0 , {C̃i , C̃i0 }i∈[1,l∗ ] , A∗ ) in Query Phase 1. Now, the advantage of solving
q +q (q +q
)
T CR
the problem instance is at least qH1 (AdvH
) ≥ qH1 (2 − H1 H123ψDQ RDQ −
∗
2 ,A
2

(2+qH2 )(qDQ +qRDQ )+qREQ +qH5
),
p

2

where qH5 is the number of H5 oracle queries. We

omit the details.
4.6. Efficiency Analysis
We first evaluate the storage of our system. Let BG1 , BG2 and BGT denote
the size of a group element in G1 , G2 and GT respectively while BZp denote
the size of a group element in Zp . Assume 160-bit elliptic curve is used for
the system. Also assume the following setting: |nk | = 5, D = 5, K = 5,
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|Sid | = 15, l = ˜l = 3, |A| = |Ã| = 5 and the description of an attribute is
encoded into a 160-bit string. The sizes of various keys are shown in Table
2.
Table 2: Sizes of various keys
CPKd +
CAPKd

CMSKk

APKk +
ACPKk

AMSKk

ucskd

ucpkd

uaska

DKid

RK

CT

(2˜l + 3)BG1 +
(|Sid | + 2)BG2 +
|A| + |Sid |+2l bits
9592

(2l + 2˜l + 3)BG1
+1BG2 + 1BGT +
|A|+|Ã|+5l bits
3857

group
element

1BGT +
1BG2

2BZp

(|nk | + D)BG1
+|nk |BG2

(|nk |+
D)BZp

1 BG2

(K + 1)BG2
+1BG1

1BG2

(2D+
|Sid |)BG2

bits

1432

318

3990

1590

478

3020

478

11950

Next we evaluate the computation cost of our system. Let EG1 , EG2 and
EGT denote the exponentiation of a group element in G1 , G2 and GT respectively while P denote a pairing operation. We omit other lightweight
algorithms such as multiplication and hashing. We assume the same setting
as above.
After that, we implemented our scheme by using the PBC library (version
0.5.14), GMP library (6.0.0) with VS .NET 2010. The testbed is Intel Xeon
CPUE5-2680 2.70GHz, 4 GB Ram, Windows 7 32 bits. We tested with the
MNT curve (type d159) and the BN curve (type f) in the PBC library, and
found that the former curve gives a better performance for our scheme. The
result is summarized in Table 3, which is the average running time for 10
iterations, in millisecond.
Table 3: Running Time
CASetup
algo.

EGT

msec.

37.6

AASetup
(|nk | + D)EG1
+|nk |EG2
181

CAKeyGen
(3 + K)EG2
+1EG1
234

AAKeyGen
4D P +
DEG2
727.2

PHREncrypt
(3 + 2l)EG1
+ EG2 +EGT
56.2

PHRDecrypt
(6 + 4l)P +
1EG1 +2lEGT
299.8

ReKeyGen
(3l + 3)EG1 +
(|Sid | + 2)EG2 +1EGT
271.6

PHRReEnc
(2l + 2˜l + 9)P
+(l + ˜l)EGT
506.2

5. Cross Domain Operations
Our framework is flexible to support different operations on PHR across
multiple domains, where each domain could represent a single country with
its own set of regulations regarding the storage or handling of PHRs. We
consider the following two cross domain operations.

PHRReDec
(3+2˜l)P +3EG1
+(˜l + 1)EGT
250
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5.1. Complete Transfer of PHRs to another domain
This operation is needed when one domain would like to transfer all of
its records to another domain. For instance, if two domains are merging,
or a new domain is scheduled to replace an existing one. The operation
requires that a vast amount of PHRs in an existing domain to be transferred
to another domain in such a way that the access policy of these PHRs in the
target domain could be different. We assume this operation is initiated and
handled by the set of central authorities.
Our framework utilises the cryptographic primitive called ABE, which
is a form of public key encryption with a set of CAs. When the set of CAs
cooperate, they can decrypt all PHRs in our system4 . Furthermore, since it is
a public key encryption system, the set of CAs can, without the cooperation
of the target domain, re-encrypt the PHR file under the access policy required
by the target domain. The algorithm is described below in the framed box
of PHR-Transfer.
PHR-Transfer. Given an encryption of a PHR file (C, C 0 , {Cx , Cx0 }x∈[1,l] ,
B, σ, A = (A, ρ)), the set of CAs, with secret keys α1 , . . . , αd , can recover
the Q
underlying message (regardless of the policy) as: M ||β||γ = C ⊕
0
αd
H2 ( D
d=1 ê(C , g) ). After recovering M , the set of CAs can encrypt M
for the target domain using the algorithm PHR-Encrypt.
5.2. User initiated PHR transfer (cross domain PHR sharing)
This operation allows a user who has access to a certain PHR to share this
record with users in a different domain. For instance, a patient immigrating
to another country may wish to transfer his/her PHR to the domain in the
new country.
The idea of cross domain PHR sharing is similar and any user who has
access to a PHR record can conduct the sharing by first issuing a PHRDecrypt on the record in the current domain, which requires his/her secret
key. After that, the user issues PHR-Encrypt in the foreign domain, which
only requires the public parameters of the foreign domain.
4

That is the reason we assume at least one of the CAs is honest and will not abuse its
power.
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6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we proposed a general framework of secure sharing of PHRs.
Our system enables patients to securely store and share their PHR in the
cloud server to their carers or family members. Treating doctors can further
refer the patients’ medical record to specialists for research purposes, while
the patients’ personal information remain private. In addition, cross domains
operations can be supported. We provided a concrete instantiation of our
system. We also gave a simulation result for it. We believe our system is
practical and can be deployed by various medical systems in the world.
We also remark that although the mechanism proposed in this paper is
specifically targeted for PHR, we do not limit the application of the mechanism to other areas such as data sharing in the cloud or secure vehicular
network communication.
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